@davidvel
I would like your perspective on something I was thinking about. The results of the door plug inspections completed so far indicate that loose bolts on the door plug was not an isolated incident for that Flight 1282 airplane, but distressingly is a systemic issue with door plugs on the MAX-9. Moreover, right now there isn't any clear reason I can see to think the problem is limited to the MAX-9. How could a systemic error such as that occur, and how could it apparently not be detected????
I think we can rule out the possibility that this is rogue or negligent employees failing to do their job correctly, with those failures not being detected. Rather, to me this points to an open step in the manufacturing process.
In one of your earlier posts you had indicated that the door plug would be installed by Spirit in Wichita and would be removed by Boeing after fuselage delivery, so that Boeing could use that opening during final assembly. Subsequent information, however, indicates that may not have been the case; the door plugs were installed by Spirit in Wichita and never removed by Boeing.
Piecing together that information, I hypothesize that there was an unfilled and, until now, unrecognized gap between the Spirit and Boeing silo operations. Spirit was assembling fuselages with the understanding that Boeing would be using that opening in the fuselage during final assembly. So Spirit didn't perceive that installing and tightening bolts to final spec was part of their work requirement because Boeing would be removing the door plugs anyway.
Meanwhile, Boeing believed that that the fuselages it was receiving from Spirit included door plugs installed to final spec. Since Boeing never removed the door plug, Boeing never bothered to inspect the door plug installation. Which would also mean that Boeing's inspection of Wichita fuselage assemblies did not include the door plug.
This strikes me as the simplest and most direct explanation to explain a systemic gaffe of this magnitude.